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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present study was to attempt to provide an ocular
signature for the dual mechanisms of cognitive control (proactivity and reactivity)
by utilizing an eye tracker to record gaze patterns while participants were
administered a modified version of the AX-CPT 40. Additionally, we sought to
clarify whether context updating or maintenance was responsible for the higher
Total Visit Duration (TVD) on the cue location during the ISI that was found in
previous studies by providing both a short (1.5 seconds) and long (3 seconds) ISI
length. This allowed us to disentangle context updating from maintenance by
removing the demand on maintenance with a 1.5 second condition. Our analyses
provided conflicting information with the findings from previous studies where
TVD on the cue location during the ISI was positively associated with PBI. In the
current study, TVD on the cue location during the ISI was negatively associated
with PBI. This association is in the opposite direction of what was found in
previous experiments. In conclusion, further replication needs to be performed to
ascertain the accuracy of these findings.
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CHAPTER ONE
COGNITIVE CONTROL

One could argue the ability to effectively plan or organize in order to
influence future events or behaviors is a defining attribute of humankind. While
other species may have comparable memory abilities, none appear to
experience the complex interplay between cognitive control and working memory
capacity (WMC) that humans do. It is thought that the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
region of the brain is central to higher level thought processes like cognitive
control (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007), and that it is this evolutionarily
augmented portion of our brain that contributes to our humanity. The purpose of
the present study is to look at the association between cognitive control and eye
movements by utilizing a modified version of the AX-CPT.

Cognitive Control as Context Processing
Cognitive control has been defined as “the ability to regulate thoughts and
actions in accordance with internally represented behavioral goals” (Braver,
2012, p. 106). It was also defined by Reimer, Radvansky, Lorsbach, and
Armendarez (2015, p. 1374) as “a set of processes that support goal-directed
action including the representation of the task goal, its maintenance over time,
the inhibition of goal-irrelevant information, and the updating of goal information
during changing task conditions.” Essentially, when people are planning an
action or goal, they should have control over their own thoughts. People would
1

not be able to function without the ability to guide their own individual behaviors
and implement actions that achieve goals. Unfortunately, people do suffer from
cognitive control deficits and therefore research into the mechanisms behind this
ability is crucial.
Braver et al. (2001) has posited that many age-related impairments in
cognitive control can be attributed to a single deficit; the ability to correctly
represent, maintain, and update task-relevant context. According to Braver et al.,
deficits in context processing impair cognitive control in many different areas like
working memory, attention, inhibition, executive function, and episodic memory.
Braver et al. define context as any task-relevant information that is represented
internally and can bias processing in the pathways utilized for task performance.
Examples of context would be information that is manipulated or previous
responses that are maintained and monitored (Braver et al., 2001). In the Stroop
task, the word name must be inhibited when the correct color response is
relatively infrequent, but working memory underlies the inhibition mechanism to
the extent that one needs to keep the task instructions of the Stroop task in mind
while eliciting a response (Braver et al., 2001). Inhibition and attention are
mechanisms of cognitive control, but working memory is what holds it all
together. Working memory is crucial to processing contextual information
because without it, it would not be possible to inhibit an incorrect response.
Contextual information can be used strategically for preparation and it is the
processing of this information that allows humans to navigate through their
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environment effectively (Richmond, Redick, & Braver, 2015). Without the ability
to put the environment into context, humans would be unable to make an
intentional response to anything.
According to Braver et al. (2001), functions of cognitive control such as
attention and inhibition may be explained by a context-processing mechanism.
These cognitive functions utilize context processing which biases decision
making (Braver et al., 2001). Braver et al. found that elderly individuals display a
reduced sensitivity to context and it was postulated that this is why they suffer
from cognitive impairments. Elderly individuals also appear to make more errors
on tasks that measure inhibitory function like negative priming and stop-signal
paradigms (Braver et al., 2001). According to Braver et al., context
representations give top-down support for task-relevant processes. Therefore,
context processing makes it possible to ignore irrelevant stimuli and maintain
task-relevant information. Another area in which cognition tends to deteriorate
with age is attentional control. This has been shown with the Stroop Color and
Word Test (Braver et al., 2001). Context representations provide an attentional
function by choosing task-relevant information over contending task-irrelevant
sources of information (Braver et al., 2001).

Assessing Cognitive Control and
the AX-Continuous Performance Test
Cognitive control has frequently been assessed with a version of the
continuous performance task known as the AX-CPT (Braver et al., 2007).
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Different components of cognitive control are measured by the AX-CPT including
working memory, attention, and inhibition (Braver at al., 2007). Within this task,
participants are shown a series of letters (presented one at a time) and are asked
to respond to every pair of letters in the series (i.e., letter one presented first and
letter two presented second) based on a rule given by the researcher (See
Figure 1). The rule consists of responding “Yes” to the X probe (i.e., the second
letter), but only when it is preceded by an A cue (i.e., the first letter). Participants
are asked to make a “No” response to all other cases.
In the typical AX-CPT there are four trial types. One trial type represents a
target trial: AX (i.e., target cue and target probe) and three non-target trials: AY
(i.e., target cue and non-target probe), BX (i.e., non-target cue and target probe),
and BY (i.e., non-target cue and non-target probe). In the standard version of the
AX-CPT, target AX trials occur 70% of the time. Non-target trials make up 30% of
the AX-CPT with 10% allocated to BX trials, 10% to (AY) trials, and 10 % to BY
trials. The reason for this disproportionate amount of targets trials is to generate
two types of biases in the participants (Braver et al, 2007). The first bias is to
make a “Yes” response whenever an X probe is presented (Braver et al., 2007).
On BX trials (where B is any non-A cue), the correct action from the participants
is to make a “No” response (Braver et al., 2007). However, the large number of
target AX trials biases participants to make either an incorrect “Yes” response to
BX trials or to make a correct “No” response but with increased response time
(RT). This is because of how often the letter X is preceded by the letter A in other
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trials. Thus, BX trials require a person to maintain the “B” context in working
memory so that a correct (“No”) response can be given upon the presentation of
the probe. In this way, maintaining the cue allows one to inhibit the prepotent
“Yes” response upon seeing an X.
As one proceeds through the AX-CPT, the other bias that takes place is
when a participant expects the X probe after an A cue is presented (Braver et al.,
2007). For this bias, the context given by the A cue is predictive of an X probe on
a majority of trials and therefore causes participants to expect that they will have
to make a “Yes” response (Braver et al., 2007). This means that in AY trials
where an A is not followed by the letter X, participants tend to make an incorrect
“Yes” response, despite the fact that the correct response is “No.” The
participant may choose the correct response in this instance, but it is often
coupled with an increased RT. Therefore, incorrect responses and increased
RTs on the AY trials are indicative of someone who is a good context processor.
Conversely, faster RTs and correct responses on the BX trials indicate that
someone is maintaining the “B” in mind to elicit a non-targeted response and is
not forced to inhibit the response to the X because they have already prepared
the “No” response. On BY trials, participants tend to make correct responses and
have faster RTs than on the other trials. For proficient context processors, this is
because they are maintaining the “B” in mind as they respond to the probe.
However, even for those less adept at context processing, reacting to the “Y”
probe leads to correct responses and faster RTs as well. This essentially allows
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the BY trials to serve as a control or baseline. Thus, in sum, a behavioral
signature of good context processing is better performance in BX than AY trials
(Braver et al., 2001).
Developmental Differences in the AX-Continuous Performance Test
Healthy young adults have been shown to have good context processing
ability (Braver et al., 2001). In contrast, research shows that relative to younger
adults, older adults display a decreased level of cognitive control. Understanding
the mechanisms behind this is critical for potentially reducing this deficit. Agerelated reductions in dopamine concentration in the prefrontal cortex have been
associated with cognitive impairments. It is thought that this pathway is being
utilized when a person is using cognitive control (Braver et al., 2001). During
healthy aging, episodic memory deficits are the most pronounced of the
impairments in cognitive control and research has suggested that the most
severe age-related declines in episodic memory all seem to integrate the outputs
of long-term memory with relevant contextual information (Braver et al., 2001).
In a study carried out by Braver et al. (2001), a standard version of the
AX-CPT was used with younger and older adults. Braver et al. found that
younger adults showed fewer errors on the BX trials, but more AY errors than the
older adults (Braver et al., 2001). Since the BX trials are meant to measure the
inhibition response tendency by requiring the participants to hold the “B” in
working memory and using it to inhibit a “Yes” response, it would seem that the
elderly tend to acquire deficits in inhibition as they age. The contextual
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information associated with the cue should be used to inhibit the dominant
response tendency, which is to press “Yes” when they are presented with the X
probe, but this ability falters in the elderly, as the slower RTs imply. They are
reacting to the X rather than holding the “B” in WM and using it to inhibit a “Yes”
response.
Braver et al. suggest that the older adults make fewer errors on the AY
trials because they have context representation and maintenance impairments.
They do not encode the A-cue or maintain the goal in mind as well as young
adults, so they see the “Y” probe and immediately make a correct non-targeted
response. The inverse relationship in error rates on the AY and BX trials between
young adults and the elderly is a product of differences in context processing
aptitude. Holding the A or “B” cues in working memory (WM) is something at
which young adults excel compared to older adults. Therefore, the young adults
hold the A-cue in WM on AY trials, expecting to make a targeted response. This
causes them to make an incorrect “Yes” response to an AY trial. However, on BX
trials, young adults maintain the “B” cue in working memory and are prepared to
make the correct non-targeted response throughout the delay. The opposite is
true of older adults, who have WM deficits.
Mechanistically, the cognitive changes that take place later in the human
lifespan may be due to the diminished ability to process context information
(Braver, Satpute, Rush, Racine, & Barch, 2005). In a study conducted by Braver
et al. (2005), two components of context processing (activation/updating and
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maintenance) were examined in healthy younger and older adults, alongside
people inflicted with early stage dementia of the Alzheimer’s type (DAT). Braver
et al. separated these components of context processing by manipulating the
cue-probe delay between two conditions. In the short-delay condition, the cueprobe delay was 1000 ms. However, in the long-delay condition, the cue-probe
delay was 5000 ms. Braver et al. theorized that the difference in delay period
would separate maintenance from activation/updating in context processing. The
reasoning behind this is that a longer cue-probe delay would require more
context maintenance because the participant had to keep the cue in mind for a
prolonged period of time. With a short cue-probe delay, the participant has to
activate/update, but not maintain. Therefore, if the same results are still found
with a short cue-probe delay, it would mean maintenance was not a factor.
Individuals from both of the older groups displayed impairments in
activation/updating, yet only those over 75 years old and those in the DAT group
showed impairments in context maintenance; the latter group showing greater
impairments (Braver et al., 2005). By isolating context maintenance from other
components of context processing, Braver et al. was able to better our
understanding of the cognitive impairments in aging adults.
Similar to Braver et al. (2001), Lorsbach and Reimer (2008) examined
developmental differences in context processing. However, Lorsbach and Reimer
looked at differences between children and adults, whereas Braver et al.
compared young adults to older adults. Lorsbach and Reimer found that relative
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to BY trials, young adults performed more poorly on AY than BX trials.
Essentially, the young adults were focusing on the context cue (A) on nontarget
trials. In addition to this, Lorsbach and Reimer found that sixth graders had a
larger difference between BX and BY errors than young adults. Therefore, when
the cue (B) was held constant, it was more difficult for children to inhibit the
dominant, but incorrect response, to the target probe. Furthermore, the difference
between RTs for young adults on AY and BY trials was significantly larger than
the difference between AY and BY trials for sixth graders. Lorsbach and Reimer
postulate that this is due to the young adults experiencing interference from the
target cue (A). In summation, young adults were more adept at maintaining
previous context information than children, which was similar to elderly
individuals in Braver et al. (2001). The findings of this study align with the
hypothesis that young adults and children have different capacities for using
context information, which indicates that age-related changes in a context
processing mechanism may help explain the cognitive control functions of
working memory, inhibition, and attention (Lorsbach & Reimer, 2008).
In a related study, Lorsbach and Reimer (2010) investigated
developmental differences in cognitive control between third and sixth graders. In
Experiment 1, Lorsbach and Reimer found that on AY trials, third graders had
faster RTs than sixth graders. Lorsbach and Reimer suggested this was likely
because sixth graders required more time to overcome the expectancy bias
created by the cue (A). They expected an X probe to follow the cue (A) and took
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more time to inhibit their response. In contrast, sixth graders had faster RTs on
BX trials than third graders because they held the context information of the cue
(B) more effectively and had a nontarget response prepared after the cue
appeared (Lorsbach & Reimer, 2010). Experiment 1 led Lorsbach and Reimer to
attempt to discern whether these results were due to developmental differences
in cue maintenance or cue representation.
In Experiment 2, Lorsbach and Reimer (2010) adjusted the cue-probe
delay from 5500 ms to 1000 ms to reduce how long context representations must
be held in working memory. The reasoning behind this was that if Lorsbach and
Reimer found no differences between third and sixth graders on the AY and BX
trials with a shorter cue-probe delay, then it would imply that there is a
dissimilarity in the proficiency in maintaining (as opposed to simply representing)
context information between the two groups. They did indeed find age-related
differences in the ability to maintain context information. Another adjustment
Lorsbach and Reimer made in Experiment 2 was alternating the color of the cue
and probe (green or red). If the cue was both an A and the color red, the children
were to choose a “Yes” response. If the cue was green or if an X was not
preceded by an A, they were to give a “No” response. This manipulation was
done to assess whether the differences between the two groups were due to the
capacity for representing goal information when presented with the cue
(Lorsbach & Reimer, 2010). If the condition where the representational demands
were high resulted in differences between the groups, independent of delay, this
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would suggest that the ability to effectively represent goal information is
responsible for the developmental differences. Lorsbach and Reimer found that
when representational demands were high, there were developmental
differences. This means that the ability to both represent and maintain goal
information improves as children age.

Dual Mechanisms of Control Framework
More recently, a number of studies have demonstrated that there is both
intra-individual and inter-individual variation in performance on the AX-CPT
(Braver et al., 2001). The dual mechanisms of control framework (DMC) attempts
to explain why there is variation within and between individuals in cognitive
control abilities (Braver et al., 2007). According to the DMC, the two major
strategies or approaches to cognitive control are proactive and reactive control
(Braver, 2012). Reactive control requires a stimulus from the environment to
reactivate a goal that is not being held in working memory in order to achieve
realization of the desired result (Braver, 2012). In reactive control, cognitive
control is dependent on bottom-up input. Reactive control is used after, as
opposed to before, a certain event happens (Braver et al., 2007). According to
Braver et al. (2007), reactive control tends to be used as needed and is more like
an “on-the-fly” cognitive control mechanism. Thus, Braver et al. describe reactive
control as a “just-in-time” strategy. By contrast, proactive control involves
maintaining goal-relevant information in working memory so that the goal may be
achieved in the future. It is used before an event happens and involves keeping a
11

goal in mind up until the event. As a result, the difference between proactive and
reactive control has been likened to the difference between early selection and
late correction, respectively (Braver et al., 2007).
Proactive and reactive control each have advantages and disadvantages,
so utilizing each mechanism at appropriate times allows people to be cognitively
efficient in different environments. For example, a disadvantage of proactive
control is that it uses up a great deal of cognitive resources since it requires
continued attention while utilizing working memory (Braver et al., 2012).
Therefore, it is not always the best strategy, so people spend the majority of their
time utilizing reactive control. If people were to use proactivity all the time, they
would not be able to allocate their mental resources to other things that may
require their attention. In reactive control, goal representations are retrieved only
when they are needed, and it has the advantage of freeing up resources during
the time between when the intention is formed and when it is completed (Braver,
2012). This is similar to how many computer systems operate because they use
a top-down flow of control (proactive control) but use a bottom-up flow of control
for interrupts (reactive control) (Braver et al., 2007).
The degree to which one is utilizing a proactive vs. reactive strategy has
been assessed using the Proactivity Behavioral Index (PBI). The PBI is
calculated by entering RTs or error rates associated with AY and BX trials in the
following formula: (AY – BX) / (AY + BX) (Gonthier, Macnamara, Chow, Conway,
& Braver, 2016). The higher that the PBI is, the more proactive the participant is,
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while an increase in the use of a reactive strategy is associated with lower PBI
scores. In the study done by Richmond, Redick, and Braver (2015), they found
that using proactive control results in a higher error rate on AY trials and using
reactive control leads to a higher error rate on BX trials.
The DMC accounts for humans being able to alternate between proactivity
and reactivity in order to attain an objective in an ever-changing environment. A
disadvantage of reactive control is that “it requires repeated reactivation of the
goal rather than continuous maintenance” (Braver, 2012, p. 3). During a short
time, employing proactive control makes more sense and is more efficient
(Braver, 2012). However, longer periods of time may be best suited for reactive
control (Braver, 2012). This is because using proactive control all day long to
keep a goal in mind may draw upon more resources than would be necessary
(Braver, 2012).
An everyday example of proactive vs. reactive control can be found in
going to a laundromat after work. With a proactive strategy, a person would
maintain this goal in working memory throughout the day, whereas a reactive
strategy would entail not holding the goal of going to the laundromat in working
memory throughout the day, but instead depending on a stimulus or a trigger
event that would bring the event (going to the laundromat) to mind (Braver et al.,
2007). For example, seeing a laundromat ticket on the car seat might serve as a
trigger that reminds the person that he or she needs to pick up laundry after
work.
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Lorsbach and Reimer (2010) found that cognitive control develops from
ages 8 to 13 years and in a similar study learned that it continues to develop from
when children are in sixth grade to when they are young adults (Lorsbach &
Reimer, 2008). This gives us evidence supporting the idea that proactivity use
increases as one ages. However, according to Braver et al. (2005), this increase
in proactivity utilization declines at around the age of 60. It appears that children
and the elderly use a more reactive control strategy than those in adulthood.
Developmental differences in cognitive control suggest that there is not a single
or uniform strategy being employed when storing and maintaining goal-relevant
information, and that this process is dynamic. The DMC account serves to shed
light upon this by offering a theory that incorporates proactive and reactive
control strategies.
Employing a proactive control strategy is associated with having a strong
tendency to relate prior contextual information to an objective. By using prior
contextual information to analyze events, one typically is exhibiting good
decision-making skills (van Wouwe, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2009). The AX-CPT is
adept at emulating context processing situations and “yields errors when a target
probe appears in a non-target context or when a non-target probe appears in a
target context” (van Wouwe et al., 2009). In an article by van Wouwe et al., they
posit that events bound to episodic memory bias future actions and allow the
participants who initially use primarily reactive control to improve performance by
switching to proactive control to a degree. There is a tradeoff between proactive
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and reactive control and there are advantages to each. Therefore, the brain
switches back and forth between the two modes of cognitive control depending
on the environment and/or goal in mind.

Brain Activity
Pisapia and Braver (2006) found that during proactive control, participants
showed sustained activity in the anterior and lateral pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and
during reactive control, they had transient activity in the lateral PFC. This is likely
because keeping a goal in mind requires sustained activity and responding to a
stimulus from the environment would require transient activation once the
stimulus is shown (Carlos, 2018). Proactivity also appears to be associated with
dopamine in the PFC (Braver et al, 2012) and when utilizing proactivity, one
needs to continuously maintain the goal in memory, therefore, sustained activity
in the PFC means a person is using proactive control. With short, intermittent
activity in the lateral PFC, it can be concluded that a stimulus-driven strategy
would only appear activated immediately after the stimulus is presented in the
environment. The dual mechanisms of cognitive control framework support these
findings because it verifies that there are two types of activity during cognitive
control. The length of activity for each of the two strategies employed solidifies
the idea of proactivity and reactivity. Braver et al. (2007) also found that there is
activity in the medial temporal lobe of the hippocampus, while storing goal
information to memory. This coincides with the many studies surrounding the
importance of the hippocampus in memory.
15

The PFC plays a major role in the active maintenance of context
information processing in other parts of the brain to keep this maintained
information (Braver et al., 2007). By doing this, the PFC interacts with the
hippocampus (central to memory) during proactivity and the premotor cortex
during reactivity (Braver et al., 2007). Understanding how the PFC interacts with
other neural networks is crucial to understanding the DMC account. Proactive
and reactive cognitive control is governed by different portions of the brain;
however, the PFC seems to be the core of these strategies.

Individual Differences in Modes of Control
Using measure of reactive control, Chevalier (2015) found that young
children and aging adults tend to utilize a reactive mode of control more than a
proactive model (Chevalier, 2015). However, Chevalier found that young children
may be capable of proactive control, but make different metacognitive decisions
than older children do. When reactive control becomes more difficult to
implement than proactive control in a scenario, children use proactive control.
This contrasts with older children, who use proactive control more frequently.
Van Gerven, Hurks, Bovend’Eerdt, and Adam (2016) recently examined
how differences in age result in dissimilar prevalence of proactivity and reactivity
in cognitive control. The participants ranged from ages 5-97 years and it was
found that people generally utilize reactive cognitive control early in life (under 12
years of age) before they switch to proactivity for most of their life, then switch
back to reactivity around the age of 60. Cognitive control quality improves
16

throughout childhood, remains relatively stable from adolescence and on, at least
up until the age of 60, where it begins to decline again. Their results were also
consistent with the idea that inhibitory function has a high potential to deteriorate
(Van Gerven et al, 2016).
Morales, Yudes, Gomez-Ariza, and Bajo (2015) administered the AX-CPT
to groups of monolinguals and bilinguals while measuring Event Related
Potentials (ERP). The AX-CPT predicts efficient performance by requiring
participants to adjust monitoring (proactive) and inhibition (reactive) control
(Morales, Gomez-Ariza, and Bajo, 2013). They found that bilinguals used the
proactive cognitive control strategy more often than monolinguals. Morales et al.
hypothesize that fluently speaking two languages allows the bilinguals to switch
effectively between the two modes of cognitive control.
Unlike other psychotic disorders, schizophrenia spectrum illnesses seem
to be linked to working memory impairments (McClure, Flory, Barch, Harvey, &
Siever, 2008) and these deficits affect context processing tasks substantially. In
the study by McClure et al., 63 people with schizotypal personality disorder
(SPD), 23 with other personality disorders, and 42 healthy individuals that served
as controls were given 3 versions of the modified AX Continuous Performance
Test and an N-back working memory test (McClure et al., 2008). They found that
those with schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) appear to make several context
processing errors on these tests, providing support for context processing
impairments in schizophrenia spectrum illnesses (McClure et al., 2008).
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Lesh et al. (2013) conducted an experiment with both healthy controls and
patients with schizophrenia and found that the healthy individuals showed activity
in the parietal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex during
proactivity and reactivity. However, patients with schizophrenia showed activation
during reactivity, but little activation during proactivity (Lesh et al., 2013). The
results imply that schizophrenic patients utilize reactive cognitive control more
often than proactivity when compared to healthy individuals. Therefore, patients
with schizophrenia mostly use reactivity, much like children under 12 years of
age and elderly individuals over the age of 60.

Eye Movements in Cognitive Control
Many studies have been conducted that track eye movements while
participants perform various cognitive tasks (Hutton, 2008; Michell et al., 2008).
By doing so, researchers are able to discern where people’s attention is during
these tasks. While the association between eye movements and various aspects
of cognition have been explored extensively, few studies have been done that
measure a participant’s gaze while using proactive versus reactive control.
Saccades
Experiments carried out in non-human primates have found that it takes a
total of 60 ms for a signal to trigger a saccadic eye movement to a specific
location once it reaches the retina (Hutton, 2008). However, a saccade made
toward a target takes approximately 200 ms in humans and it is hypothesized
that this extra amount of time to make a saccade is caused by people deciding
18

where to look and or where not to look (Hutton, 2008). This implies that cognition
plays a role in the latency of saccades directed toward an unexpected target.
Therefore, the latency of a saccade is indicative of the time it takes to decide
whether to look at a particular location (Hutton, 2008). According to Hutton, goal
directed behavior hinges on the capacity to properly maintain and manipulate
context information while also ignoring irrelevant information and inhibiting an
inclination toward an undesired response. These abilities are components of
working memory and reflect one’s level of proactivity. An antisaccade task
requires a person to look in the opposite direction of a flashed cue shown in their
periphery. It is a reflex for one to look at the flashed cue when it is positioned
within peripheral vision. Therefore, an antisaccade involves inhibiting a
predisposed response. Roberts, Hager, and Heron (1994) carried out a study
which found that performing antisaccade tasks and solving mental arithmetic
problems simultaneously resulted in more errors and longer latency times on the
antisaccade tasks. It appears that allocating cognitive resources to solving the
arithmetic problems reduces the resources available to make accurate and fast
controlled saccadic eye movements. Therefore, deficits in antisaccade
performance vary according to working memory load (Mitchell, Macrae, &
Gilchrist, 2002).
Intentional Oculomotor Behavior
The ability to deliberately look at a visual stimulus can be examined by
fixation tasks, which reflects cognitive control (Luna, Velanova, & Geier, 2008).
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The gaze is intentional, therefore, there is a goal in mind that influences one’s
oculomotor response. Suppressing automatic responses to inhibit an undesired
behavior, maintaining information to premeditate a response (working memory),
and altering the focus of attention are all components of cognitive control that can
be measured by eye movements (Luna et al., 2008). According to Luna et al.,
these components work together, but can be identified separately. Examining
eye movements while someone is utilizing each distinctive element of cognitive
control (inhibition, working memory, and attention) gives us direct
neurophysiological measures of cognitive control.
There is considerable variability in the age-related maturation of eye
movements governed by cognitive control (Luna et al., 2008). Luna et al. found
that the processes reflective of cognitive control all are present early on but differ
in their flexibility of use. The capacity for inhibiting saccades improves greatly
from childhood to adulthood (Luna et al, 2008). However, according to Luna et
al., the elderly display a more subtle reduction in the ability to inhibit saccades,
which coincides with the studies related to declines in cognitive control. Luna et
al. also established that those with schizophrenia, autism, and depression show
similar deficits in saccades governed by cognitive control, despite these
disorders being related to impairments in different brain functions.
Pupillary Changes and Blink Rates in Adults
In a study by Mäki-Marttunen et al. (2018), pupillary changes and blink
rate were measured while administering the AX-CPT to young healthy adults.
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Enlarged pupils and increased blink rate were indicative of greater cognitive
effort allocation (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2018). They used these two
psychophysical measurements during the cue maintenance and response
intervals (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2018). Participants were divided into proactive,
reactive, and intermediate groups based on their PBI, which is a measure of how
proactive or reactive someone is (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2018). The study
reported that during the cue period, the less frequent non-target B cues
significantly increased pupil size and blink rate in all participants. During the
presentation of the probe, AY trials caused pupil dilation in all participants, but
larger pupil dilation in participants classified as proactive (Mäki-Marttunen et al.,
2018). Although Mäki-Marttunen et al. (2018) expected otherwise, the groups did
not differ in blink rate or pupillary changes while the cue was presented. In all
groups, the blink rates were significantly higher during the delay period after a
non-target cue than when the cue was an “A” (Mäki-Marttunen et al, 2018). The
amount of time before the first blink after the cue was presented was shorter
when the cue was an “A” than when it was a non-target cue (Mäki-Marttunen et
al., 2018). After the probe was presented, there was a longer amount of time
before the first blink after AY trials than in the other trials (Mäki-Marttunen et al.,
2018).
Taken together, these data suggest that proactive participants showed
increased cognitive effort allocation after the probe appeared in AY trials and
those from the reactive group utilized more cognitive effort after the probe in BX
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trials. This was shown by increased pupillary size during these periods (MäkiMarttunen et al., 2018). For the more proactive group, this was potentially due to
participants inhibiting an incorrect targeted response after having encoded and
maintained the A cue. The authors theorized that in reactive participants, the “X”
probe was associated with an “A” cue, therefore, it required more cognitive effort
to inhibit the dominant targeted response tendency when the probe was an “X”
on BX trials (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2018). Mäki-Marttunen et al. suggest that
mostly reactive participants are more susceptible to interference from familiarity.
Developmental Differences in Pupil Dilation
In a study by Chatham, Frank, & Munakata (2009), the AX-CPT was given
to a group of 3.5-year-olds and a group of 8-year-olds while measuring pupil
dilation. The 8-year-olds were found to be more proactive than the 3.5-year-olds
(Chatham et al., 2009). Averaged across all trials, the 8-year-olds exhibited
larger pupils than the 3.5-year-olds during the delay period (Chatham et al.,
2009). This points to increased cognitive effort allocation for context maintenance
in proactive participants (Chatham et al., 2009). 3.5-year-olds had larger pupils
throughout the probe period which alludes to increased mental effort for context
retrieval (Chatham et al., 2009). The idea that reactive participants allocate
increased cognitive effort for context retrieval is consistent with previous literature
on cognitive control.
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CHAPTER TWO
PRESENT STUDY

The purpose of the present study is to assess whether eye gaze data can
be used to predict modes of cognitive control and provide information regarding
the nature of cognitive control in young adults (i.e., the role of context updating
vs. maintenance). Previous research has examined the ocular signature of
cognitive control, specifically related to strategies that people utilize. Recall that
Mäki-Marttunen et al. (2018) demonstrated that people using a proactive mode of
control during the AX-CPT showed larger pupil size during probe presentation on
AY trials than reactive participants. This suggests that proactive participants
expended increased mental effort to inhibit the prepotent response (i.e., a target
response) that was prepared based on the A cue. In contrast, on BX trials,
reactive participants displayed greater pupil size than proactive participants
during probe presentation. In this case, the reactive group allocated greater
cognitive effort to inhibit an incorrect target response to the X probe. In order to
do so, they had to reactivate the cue’s identity, which was not proactively kept
active in WM. These findings demonstrate that there are ocular differences
between participants who adopted a more proactive, compared to a more
reactive, mode of control in terms of the amount of cognitive effort allocated
during probe processing.
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One unexpected result in Mäki-Marttunen et al.’s (2018) study was that
they failed to find differences in pupillary changes between reactive and proactive
participants during cue presentation, or, more importantly, during the cue-probe
delay. In order to address this shortcoming, Reimer, Sierra, Mobly, PerezMartinez, and Rivera (2020) conducted a study designed to measure eye
movements during a 3 s cue-probe delay within the AX-CPT. In an attempt to
identify possible differences in eye movements and fixations during the cueprobe delay of the AX-CPT, a modified version of the task known as the AX-CPT
40 (Richmond et al., 2015) was used. In Reimer et al.’s study, cues were
centered on the left-hand side of the computer screen (see Figure 2), while
probes were presented either at the top or the bottom right-hand side of the
screen (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). In this case, probe location was determined by
the cue’s identity (i.e., A or B). For AX and AY trials, cues were always paired
with a probe located at the top-right corner of the screen, while with BX and BY
trials, probes were presented at the bottom-right corner of the screen. As a
result, participants could perfectly predict the location of the probe based on the
identity of the cue, and therefore, create an expectation as to where the probe
would be located on any given trial. Reimer et al. were interested in determining
where participants fixed their eye gaze during the cue-probe delay period as a
way to potentially differentiate between participants who utilized a proactive vs.
reactive mode of control. Specifically, Reimer et al., were interested in measuring
the amount of time participants spent looking at three locations during the cue-
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probe delay: the cue location and the two probe locations (top and bottom) (see
Figure 6).
Recall that PBI has been used as a measure of the use of proactive
control during the AX-CPT (higher PBI values are associated with an increased
use of proactive control). Reimer et al. found that the amount of time participants
spent looking at the cue AOI (Area of Interest) during the delay predicted the
degree to which individuals utilized a proactive vs. reactive mode of control as
measured by PBI. Specifically, for AY trials (see Figures 7 and 8), cue TVD
(Total Visit Duration) predicted PBI in participants who spent more time looking at
the cue AOI than the top probe AOI, but not for participants who spent more time
looking at the top AOI than the cue AOI. For BX trials (see Figure 9), increased
TVD in the cue region was associated with higher PBI. Reimer et al. interpreted
these results as indicating that increases in the use of a proactive mode of
control are associated with an increased amount of time spent on context
updating during the ISI.
Taken together, the results of the Mäki-Marttunen et al. (2018) and Reimer
et al. (2019) studies indicate that specific ocular signatures may be associated
with proactive and reactive control strategy use during the AX-CPT. What is still
not clear, however, is whether the greater cue-region TVD that is associated with
proactive control in Reimer et al.’s study stems from increased context updating,
or from increased cue maintenance, during the delay period. Our current
hypothesis is that this relationship is caused by the increased time required to
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fully integrate the cue’s identity and the AX-CPT rule under a proactive control
strategy. According to this account, proactive control on the AX-CPT relies on the
intentional engagement of cue encoding that involves three critical components:
1) an initial encoding of the cue’s perceptual features in order to build a
representation of the cue’s identity (A or B), 2) integrate the cue’s identity and the
AX-CPT rule in order to prepare a response (e.g., “press ‘target’ key if probe is
an X” for an A cue; or “press ‘nontarget’ key” for a B cue), and 3) activate a
motor-based response set. If this is the case, the association between increased
TVD in the cue region and PBI with both AY and BX trials found by Reimer et al.,
may result from the presence of individual differences in the control of the context
updating process. Engagement in this form of controlled updating takes time,
resulting in increased eye fixation on the cue region that may last even into the
delay period after the cue disappeared. Previous research has demonstrated that
people tend to maintain a local eye gaze pattern in one area during the encoding
of information (e.g. Patt et al., 2014). Given that there are individual differences
in working memory and attentional control (Unsworth & Robinson, 2015), small
cue-region TVD may reflect a shift to a less demanding (at least initially) reactive
strategy on the part of some participants. In this account, therefore, cue-region
TVD during the cue-probe delay in the AX-CPT may represent a new ocular
signature of proactive cognitive control.
What is still unclear, however, is the role that the relatively long cue-probe
delay (3 s) used by Reimer et al.’s (2020) played in their results. It is possible
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that the relationship between cue-region TVD and PBI found by Reimer et al.
was largely a function of the relatively long cue-probe delay that was used. That
is, it is possible that the increased TVD in the cue region associated with high
PBI individuals may have not reflected only increased cue processing, but also
the use of an additional maintenance process, or at least the preparation of a
maintenance process, that was engaged to proactively keep cue-related
representations active in WM over the relatively long delay. The present study is
designed to test this possibility. Specifically, the present experiment is designed
to determine whether the relationship between cue-region TVD and PBI found by
Reimer et al. is present only when a relatively long delay is used, or whether this
relationship can also be found when a shorter cue-probe delay is used, where
demand associated with cue maintenance is significantly reduced.
According to the present account, the relationship between cue-region
TVD and PBI is the result of individual differences in the engagement of proactive
context updating after cue presentation, and not the result of increased
maintenance demands associated with a long delay. If this is the case, a
relationship between cue-region TVD and PBI should be found even when a
relatively shorter cue-probe delay is used, as long as participants are given
enough time to fully integrate the cue identity with the rule provided. Thus, the
present study extends Reimer et al.’s (2020) study by examining eye movements
during the cue-probe delay of the AX-CPT under two cue-probe delay conditions:
a short (1500 ms) and long (3000 ms) cue-probe delay condition. A 1500 ms
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cue-probe delay was chosen for the short delay condition for two reasons. First,
a similar (1000 ms) delay has been used in previous studies to reduce the
demands of cue maintenance (see e.g., Braver et al., 2001; Lorsbach & Reimer,
2010). Second, this delay will still allow ample time for participants to fully encode
the cue and incorporate the AX-CPT rule. In Reimer et al.’s study, the average
amount of time that proactive people fixated on the cue was approximately 900
ms. As in Reimer et al.’s study, the present study will use an adapted version of
the AX-CPT 40. This version of the AX-CPT has 40% BY and 40% AX trials. BX
and AY each comprise 10% of the total trials. The probes in the AY and AX trials
will always appear at the top-right of the screen and BX and BY will always
appear at the bottom-right.
We expect to find a similar pattern of response times (RTs) and error rates
on BX and AY trials to that which has been found previously in the literature.
Specifically, we expect to find that most participants will use proactive control and
thus will have higher accuracy and faster RTs on BX trials relative to AY trials
(resulting in a relatively high PBI). Regarding results from the eye tracking data,
there are at least two different possible outcomes of interest. First, it is possible
that the context updating account presented above is correct. If this is the case,
similar to Reimer et al. (2020), we should find that increased TVD in the cue
region is positively correlated with PBI in both AY and BX trials. If, however, the
relationship between cue-region TVD and PBI found by Reimer et al. were
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largely a function of the relatively long cue-probe delay that they used, we expect
to find that such a relationship will not be found in the short-delay condition.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

Participants
In this study, there were 87 participants and all had normal or correctedto-normal vision. Eighteen participants were excluded from the analysis (2 due to
computer error and 16 because the eye tracker captured less than 50% of the
potential gaze data), leaving 69 participants (M age: 23.3 years; SD: 3.9; age
range: 18-37 years; 59 females, 10 males). The study was conducted according
to the Institutional Review Board guidelines at California State University, San
Bernardino. All participants were provided with informed consent.

Design
This study used a 4 (Trial Type: AX vs AY vs BX vs BY) x 3 (AOI Location:
cue, top probe, bottom probe) x 2 (Cue-Probe Delay: 1.5 s vs. 3 s) mixeddesign. Trial type varied within participants while Cue-Probe Delay varied
between participants. Dependent variables included error rates and RTs, as well
as Total Visit Duration (TVD) at each AOI. The two cue-probe delay conditions
were counterbalanced across participants.
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Apparatus
Eye tracking was implemented utilizing a Tobii T60XL eye tracker on a
Dell OptiPlex 9020 desktop computer running Windows 7. The system
specifications of this computer include an Intel Core i7 processor, 16 gigabytes of
RAM, and a 24-inch LCD monitor with 1920 x 1080 pixels resolution. The
sampling rate of the eye tracker was 60Hz with a processing latency of less than
17 ms and a RT of 4 ms. This computer was linked via an ethernet cable to a
computer that ran the AX-CPT 40 using E-Prime 3.0 software. The computer with
the AX-CPT was a Dell OptiPlex 7050 running Windows 10 with an Intel Core i5
processor, 8 gigabytes of RAM, and a 20-inch monitor with 1920 x 1080 pixels
resolution.

Materials
The sensors on the eye tracker pinpoint and register eye-fixations and
gaze duration to particular areas of the monitor screen. The AX-CPT 40 was
presented on the eye tracker monitor and the participants were positioned
approximately 65 cm from the monitor by use of a chin rest mounted to a table.
Gaze data was processed in Tobii Studio and the AX-CPT-40 was programmed
in E-Prime 3.0. The letters were in uppercase red 18pt Consolas font on a black
background. E-Prime 3.0 recorded RTs and error rates for the participants
completing the AX-CPT 40.
The AX-CPT included four types of trials (see Figure 10; Braver et al.,
2001): AX target trials (“A” cue followed by “X” probe), AY trials (“A” cue followed
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by a letter other than “X”), BX trials (”B” cue followed by an “X”), and BY trials
(the cue is a “B” and the probe is not an “X”). On the typical AX-CPT, the
proportion of AX, AY, BX, and BY trials is (AX = .70), (AY = .10), (BX = .10), and
(BY = .10), respectively. The reason for the disproportionate amount of AX trials
is to create a bias toward targeted responses. Participants expect A and X to be
paired together because this is true 70% of the time when there is an A cue. In
the AX-CPT 40 (the version to be employed in this study), there is a different
ratio of each type of trial (AX = .40), (AY = .10), (BY = .40), and (BX = .01).
Letters were presented to the participants in pairs, one at a time. In the
long cue-probe delay condition participants were required to look at the cue for
1000 ms (indicated by a box around the letter). The cue-probe delay (delay
period with black screen) lasted for 3000 ms and the probe appeared for 500 ms.
In the short cue-probe delay condition, participants were also required to look at
the cue for 1000 ms but the cue-probe delay lasted for only 1500 ms. A response
box with buttons labeled “Yes” (target) and “No” (nontarget) was used for
recording responses from the participants. Participants used their right index
finger to press the “Yes” button and their right middle finger to press the “No”
button.
All participants were given identical instructions for the experiment. In the
AX condition, the probe was always presented at the top-right of the screen (see
Figure 2). In the BY condition, the probe was always presented at the bottomright of the screen (see Figure 3). The AY condition displayed the probe at top-
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right of the screen (see Figure 4) and the BX condition presented the probe at
the bottom-right (see Figure 5). Feedback was provided by a sound from the
speakers of the computer immediately after participants responded to the probe.
A chime sounded for correct responses and the participants heard a buzzer if
they chose an incorrect response. If the participant took longer than 1500 ms to
respond to the probe, a message would display on the screen requesting that
they respond faster.
A practice version of the task consisting of 10 trials was given to
participants in order to allow them ample time to ask questions. The AX-CPT was
programmed with 4 blocks of 40 trials with 3 optional breaks in between blocks to
give the participants an opportunity to rest. Statistical analyses of behavioral data
were performed in IBM SPSS statistical software. The proactive behavioral index
(PBI) was calculated for each participant by using AY and BX error rates and
RTs (Braver et al., 2009) with the formula: (AY - BX) / (AY + BX). Number of
errors was computed using: (number of errors + 0.5) / (number of trials + 1). The
PBI falls between -1 and +1. Scores closer to +1 indicate a more proactive
strategy and scores closer to -1 indicate a more reactive strategy being
employed. A score of 0.0 means there were equal numbers of errors made on
AY and BX trials. Participants were categorized into two groups: proactive (PBI
> 0) and reactive (PBI < 0). If Tobii Studio captured less than 50% of eye gaze
data, then that participant was excluded from the analysis.
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Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a well-lighted room and
administered either version of the AX-CPT (short vs. long cue-probe delay) in a
single session that lasted approximately 30 minutes. After signing a consent form
and filling out their demographic information (date of birth, gender, and indicating
whether they wear glasses), participants were randomly assigned to either the
short or long cue-probe delay condition and seated in front of the eye tracking
sensor. Participants were seated opposite the center of the monitor and
instructed to adjust the seating position to a height that they deemed
comfortable. They were then be told to place their chin on the chin rest and were
informed of the calibration process. The calibration involved a visual target that
moved around the screen. The participants were told to follow the target with
their gaze until calibration ended. The target stopped at 5 positions: four at each
corner and the fifth at the center of the screen. If calibration was not completed
successfully, it was repeated until all 5 bullet points displayed a green dot in them
(indicative of a successful calibration).
Participants were instructed to make a targeted response (press “Yes”
button) when they saw the letter “X”, but only when it was preceded by the letter
“A”. For all other pairs of letters, the participants were instructed to make a nontargeted response (press the “No” button). Each letter was presented on the
screen one at a time. The participants were also informed that the location of the
letters should have no bearing on whether they press the “Yes” or “No” button. It
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was made known on two separate occasions throughout the instructions that the
participants are to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. In addition to
this, they were given the opportunity to ask any questions they may have.
Before beginning the task, participants were given a practice session
consisting of ten trials. If they had no questions and seemed to understand the
task, the participants began the AX-CPT. The AX-CPT was divided into 4 blocks
with 40 trials each. Within each block there were 16 AX, 4 AY, 4 BX, and 16 BY
trials. The participants were given the opportunity to take a short break in
between each block of trials. The researcher was seated behind the participant
and remained in the room throughout the task in order to answer any questions
the participant may have had as they completed the task. Upon completing the
AX-CPT 40, participants were assigned 3 points of extra credit through SONA.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

A total of eighteen participants were removed from the analyses. Two
participants were removed due to computer error. Another sixteen participants
were excluded because the eye tracker captured less than fifty percent of the
potential gaze data. This may have been caused by several factors such as
interference from eye make-up or the participant being too fatigued to look at the
screen for an adequate amount of time. On average, eye gaze samples were
recorded to a data file 71.5% (SD = 9.5%) of the time across conditions and
participants in the study. The final sample included 69 participants. RT and error
rate means were computed for both conditions, however, only data for trials
where a correct response was given and had a RT greater than 200 ms were
analyzed. TVD reported below was calculated by dividing the total number of eye
gaze samples in which a fixation was recorded within a particular AOI by the total
number of all eye gaze samples recorded during the cue-probe delay. This was
done separately for each participant within each trial type. These TVD scores,
therefore, reflect the proportion of total eye gaze samples recorded during the
cue-probe delay that included a fixation within a specific AOI. It should be
clarified that “cue-probe delay” within the context of this study refers to the ISI
and not the stimulus onset interval (SOA) traditionally examined in the literature.
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Response Time and Accuracy for Target and Non-Target Trials
Mean RTs and error rates were computed for each participant in each trial
type (AX, AY, BX, and BY) and cue-probe delay (see Table 1 for means). An
independent samples t-test was performed to compare RT and error rates for the
AX trials in each ISI condition. There was no significant difference in RTs
between the 1.5 second ISI (M = 477 ms, SD = 78.4) and 3 second ISI (M = 484
ms, SD = 99) conditions. There was also no significant difference in error rates
between the 1.5 second ISI (M = .01%, SD = 1.2%) and 3 second ISI (M = 1.6%,
SD = 1.8%) conditions. This was as expected and indicates PBI should have
been distributed evenly across conditions.
A 2 (ISI: 1.5 s vs. 3 s) x 3 (Trial Type: AY vs. BX vs. BY) repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted on the RT data from non-target trial types.
There was a significant main effect of Trial Type, F(2, 67) = 191.3, MSE =
2674.9, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons revealed that all three means were
significantly different from each other. Participants had significantly slower RTs
on AY trials (M = 601 ms, SE = 12.6 ms) than BX trials (M = 468 ms, SE = 15.1
ms). Participants also had significantly slower RTs for BY trials (M = 439 ms, SE
= 12.8) than BX trials. No other significant effects were found. These results
indicate that certain trial types may require more inhibition.
A 2 (ISI: 1.5 s vs. 3 s) x 3 (Trial Type: AY vs. BX vs. BY) repeated
measures ANOVA was also conducted on the error rate data for non-target trials
(AY, BX, and BY). There was a significant main effect of Trial Type for error rate,
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F(2, 67) = 26.9, MSE = .001, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons revealed that all
three means were significantly different from each other. Participants had a
significantly lower error rate on BX trials (M = 1.3%, SE = .5%) than AY trials (M
= 4.2%, SE = .6%). Participants also had a significantly higher error rate on BX
trials than BY trials (M = 1.2%, SE = .1%). No other significant effects were
found. Taken together with the results from the previous ANOVA evaluating RT
for the different trial types, we can infer that AY trials may require the most
inhibition.

Total Visit Duration at Each Area of Interest for Target Trials
We examined differences in TVD at each AOI for AX trials with the
intention of later comparing them to AY and BX trials. This was done to assess
whether the participants were adhering to the observed rule by allowing us to
confirm that the bias generated by an A cue was being adapted. A 2 (ISI: 1.5 s
vs. 3 s) x 3 (Location AOI: Cue vs. Top Probe vs. Bottom Probe) repeated
measures ANOVA was performed for the mean proportion of TVD in a particular
AOI to total eye gaze data points captured by the eye tracker during the ISI for
the target trial type (AX). There was a significant main effect of Location, F(2,
134) = 145.9, MSE = .243, p < .001. Participants had significantly higher mean
TVD for the 1.5 s ISI condition (M = .221, SE = .009) than the 3 s ISI condition (M
= .193, SE = .012). They also had significantly higher mean TVD on the Top
Probe (M = .378, SE = .02) than both the Cue (M = .237, SE = .013) and Bottom
Probe (M = .006, SE = .001), as well as a significantly higher mean TVD on the
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Cue than the Bottom Probe. These findings suggest the bias we attempted to
elicit for AX trials was successfully generated.
There was a significant interaction between Location and Delay, F(2, 134)
= 17.4, MSE = .29, p < .001 (see Table 2 for means). For the 1.5 s ISI condition,
simple main effects test showed that there was a significant effect of Location for
AX trials, F(2, 68) = 24.9, MSE = .16, p < .001, where proportion of the TVD
spent on the Top Probe (M = .123, SE = .023) was greater than the Bottom
Probe (M = .006, SE = .002) and the Cue (M = .007, SE = .003). For the 3 s ISI
condition, simple main effects test revealed that there was also a significant
effect of Location for AX trials, F(2, 66) = 14.8, MSE = .096, p < .001. The
proportion of the TVD spent on the Top Probe (M = .153, SE = .009) was greater
than the Bottom Probe (M = .006, SE = .002) and the Cue (M = .005, SE = .002).
This further reinforces the evidence surrounding the effectiveness of the bias we
created for the participants. The probe always appears at the top after an A cue,
therefore, the participants immediately look to the top probe location after
observing the cue’s identity.

Location by Trial Type
We were then compelled to learn whether an interaction between Location
and Trial Type existed in each condition. There was a significant interaction
between Location and Trial Type for the 1.5 s ISI condition, F(6, 204) = 368.5,
MSE = 2.58, p < .001 (see Table 3 for means). A simple main effects test
revealed that there was a significant effect of Trial Type in this condition, F(3,
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102) = 648.4, MSE = 1.43, p < .001. Proportion of the TVD spent on the AOIs
was greater in AX trials (M = .384, SE = .009) than in both BX (M = .184, SE =
.009) and BY trials (M = .006, SE = .002). AY trials (M = .388, SE = .009) had a
greater proportion of TVD spent on AOIs than BX and BY trials as well. In the 3 s
ISI condition, there was a significant interaction between Location and Trial Type,
F(6, 198) = 300.4, MSE = 2.16, p < .001. A simple main effects test showed that
there was a significant effect of Trial Type in the 3 s ISI condition as well, F(3, 99)
= 327, MSE = 1.25, p < .001. Proportion of the TVD spent on the AOIs was
greater in AX trials (M = .32, SE = .01) than in both BX (M = .127, SE = .009) and
BY trials (M = .136, SE = .008). AY trials (M = .326, SE = .01) had a greater
proportion of TVD spent on AOIs than BX and BY trials as well. This interaction
indicates that participants looked at the AOI locations more often when an A cue
was presented. A potential explanation for this is that the presentation of a B cue
always requires a non-target response and does not force the participant to
update or maintain the cue once it has been identified and processed. Thus, the
participants are able to look anywhere.

Total Visit Duration at Each
Area of Interest (AY and BX Trials)
In order to address the questions we posed in this study, we found it
pertinent to examine differences in TVD at each AOI by the two trial types used
to calculate PBI. A 2 (ISI: 1.5 s vs. 3 s) x 2 (Trial Type: AY vs. BX) x 3 (Location
AOI: Cue vs. Top Probe vs. Bottom Probe) repeated measures ANOVA was
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conducted for the mean proportion of TVD in a particular AOI to total eye gaze
data points captured by the eye tracker during the ISI separately for each nontarget trial type (AY and BX). There was a significant main effect of Trial Type,
F(1, 67) = 104.3, MSE = .002, p < .001. Participants had significantly higher
mean TVD for AY trials (M =.211, SE = .01) than BX trials (M =.162, SE = .01).
There was also a significant main effect of Location, F(2, 67) = 64.4, MSE = .027,
p < .001. There was a significantly higher mean TVD on the cue (M = .244, SE =
.01) than the bottom probe (M=.058, SE = .02). There was a significantly higher
mean TVD on the cue than the top probe as well (M = .257, SE = .02). Finally,
there was a significant main effect of Delay, F(1, 67) = 8.67, MSE = .014, p < .01.
Participants had significantly higher mean TVD for the 1.5 second ISI condition
(M = .20, SE = .01) than the 3 second ISI condition (M = .169, SE = .01).
These main effects, however, were qualified by two significant
interactions. The interaction between Location and Delay was significant, F(2,
134) = 22.5, MSE = .597, p < .001 (see Figure 11). In the 1.5 s ISI condition,
participants had significantly higher mean TVD on the cue (M = .332, SE = .025)
than the top (M = .214, SE = .017) or bottom (M = .065, SE = .012) locations, as
well as more TVD on the top than bottom. In the 3 s ISI condition, participants
had significantly higher mean TVD on the top (M = .30, SE = .025) than either the
cue (M = .156, SE = .01) or bottom (M = .051, SE = .01) location. Additionally,
the proportions were higher for the cue than the bottom location.
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Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between Trial Type and
Location, F(2, 134) = 110.35, MSE = .012, p < .001 (see Figure 12). Simple main
effects test revealed that there was a significant effect of location for AY trials,
F(2, 136) = 113.76, MSE = .023, p < .001, where proportions were greater in the
cue location (M = .237, SE = .02) than the bottom (M = .006, SE = .002),
however, the proportions were greater in the top (M = .389, SE = .02) than the
cue. A significant effect of location was also found for BX trials, F(2, 136) =
17.99, MSE = .024, p < .001. However, in this case, proportions were greater in
the cue (M = .253, SE = .017) than both the top (M = .124, SE = .016) and
bottom (M = .111, SE = .017) locations. Therefore, during AY trials, participants
had greater TVD on the top probe than the cue location, but we find the opposite
for BX trials. This may potentially represent an ocular signature for these two
types of trials.

Regression Analyses for Total Visit Duration
on Cue in AX, AY, and BX Trials
A series of simple linear regressions were calculated to predict PBI scores
based on the proportion of all fixations on a given AOI during the ISI to total eye
gaze data points recorded by the eye tracker during the ISI. In the first regression
analysis, the proportion of fixations on the cue during AX trials in the 1.5 second
ISI condition significantly predicted PBI based on RT, β = -.496, t(33) = -3.28, p <
.01. Additionally, it also explained a significant proportion of variance in PBI RT,
R2 = .246, F(1, 33) = 10.74, p < .01. Another regression analysis was conducted
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to look at whether the proportion of all fixations on the cue during the ISI to total
eye gaze data points recorded by the eye tracker during the ISI predicted PBI
scores. This analysis revealed that this proportion of TVD on the cue in AY trials
in the 1.5 second ISI condition significantly predicted PBI RT, β = -.413, t(33) = 2.61, p < .05. Furthermore, it explained a significant proportion of variance in PBI
RT, R2 = .145, F(1, 33) = 6.79, p < .05. A third set of regression analyses were
performed to examine whether the proportion of all fixations on the cue during
the ISI to total eye gaze data points recorded by the eye tracker during the ISI in
BX trials predicted PBI scores. It was found that the TVD proportion used for the
cue in BX trials in the 1.5 second ISI condition predicted PBI RT, β = -.351, t(33)
= -2.15, p < .05. This same TVD measurement explained a significant proportion
of variance in PBI RT in the 1.5 second ISI condition, R2 = .096, F(1, 33) =
4.63, p < .05. For all 3 trial types, the PBI calculated using RT was negatively
correlated with the proportion of TVD on the cue.
Regression analyses were also performed for the 3 second ISI condition.
The proportion of fixations on the cue during AX trials in the 3 second ISI
condition significantly predicted PBI based on error rates as well, β = -.372, t(32)
= -2.27, p < .05. It also explained a significant proportion of variance in PBI RT,
R2 = .11, F(1, 32) = 5.14, p < .05. The regression analyses conducted for the AY
and BX trials during the 3 second ISI condition did not significantly predict PBI
from the proportion of fixations on the cue. The proportion of fixations on the cue
during AY trials in the 3 second ISI condition did not significantly predict PBI
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based on error rates, β = -.300, t(32) = -1.78, p = .085. It also did not explain a
significant proportion of variance in PBI error rates, R2 = .09, F(1, 32) = 3.15, p =
.085. Additionally, the proportion of fixations on the cue during BX trials in the 3
second ISI condition did not significantly predict PBI based on error rates, β = .256, t(32) = -1.496, p = .145. It did not explain a significant proportion of
variance in PBI error rates, R2 = .07, F(1, 32) = 2.24, p = .145.
Further regression analyses performed sought to determine the time to
first fixation (TFF) to the top and bottom probe for AY and BX trials in both
conditions. During the 1.5 second ISI condition, TFF to the bottom probe in BX
trials predicted PBI composite z scores, β = -.468, t(28) = -2.75, p < .05. It
explained a significant proportion of variance in PBI composite z scores as well,
R2 = .219, F(1, 27) = 7.58, p < .05. Additionally, TFF to the bottom probe in BX
trials predicted PBI error rates in the 1.5 second ISI condition, β = -.378, t(28) = 2.12, p < .05. A significant proportion of variance in PBI error rates was explained
by TFF to the bottom probe in BX trials, R2 = .111, F(1, 27) = 4.49, p < .05. TFF
to the bottom probe on BX trials also predicted PBI RT in the 1.5 second ISI
condition, β = -.367, t(28) = -2.05, p = .05. A significant proportion of variance in
PBI RT was explained by TFF to the bottom probe in BX trials, R2 = .102, F(1,
27) = 4.19, p = .05. In the 3 second ISI condition, TFF to the bottom probe during
BX trials predicted none of these. Furthermore, TFF to the top and bottom probe
locations during AY trials did not predict PBI.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

In the present study, we attempted to disentangle context updating from
maintenance in cognitive control. Our theory was that the positive association
between PBI and TVD on cue location in Reimer et al. (2020) would remain with
a 1.5 s ISI condition. By providing two conditions with different ISI lengths, we
were able to decrease the demand from maintenance in the shorter ISI when
comparing it alongside the 3 s ISI condition. Therefore, context updating would
have potentially been responsible for the increased TVD on the cue location
during the ISI. We also attempted to provide an ocular signature of the proactive
vs. reactive modes of cognitive control based on eye movements. Previous
research (Chatham et al., 2009; Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2018) illustrated that
proactive participants displayed an increased pupil size during AY trials when
presented with the probe, which indicated they were expending increased
cognitive effort to inhibit a target response. In contrast, reactive participants
showed larger pupil size while the probe was presented on BX trials. This
suggests the reactive participants were allocating more cognitive effort than
proactive ones in order to inhibit a target response because they needed to
spend time reactivating the cue’s identity.
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A major difference between our study and Mäki-Marttunen et al. (2018)
was the length of the ISI. Their study used a 2500 ms delay, whereas our
conditions used either a 1.5 s or 3 s delay. For this reason, the present study was
capable of decoupling context updating from maintenance by accounting for a
limitation of Mäki-Marttunen et al. (2018) and their pupillometry approach. With
pupillometry, the size of the pupil is measured, but what was lacking in order to
disentangle context updating and maintenance was a duration metric.
Pupillometry is unable to discern the length of maintenance during the ISI
because it only indicates that increased cognitive effort is being utilized. This
does not provide a metric that can distinguish between the context updating and
maintenance components of cognitive control.
During the ISI on the AX-CPT 40, Reimer et al. (2020) found a positive
association between increased TVD on the cue and PBI for BX trials. The
amount of time spent on the cue location after it disappears may be indicative of
the level of control one has during the context updating process. It may be that
proactive individuals simply take longer to update. Alternatively, the longer TVD
on the cue during ISI for proactive participants may indicate a greater degree of
context maintenance being used. To address this ambiguity, we adjusted the
study conducted by Reimer et al. and added a 1.5 s ISI condition to compare
alongside the 3 s ISI condition. This was done to decrease the demand required
by context maintenance and served to isolate the context updating phase. It was
hypothesized that the association between cue TVD and PBI would persist in the
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1.5 s condition, suggesting there is a context updating mechanism responsible
for longer TVD on the cue in proactive participants.
In the present study, for AX trials, participants spent more time on the top
probe than the bottom probe or cue in both the 1.5 s and 3 s ISI conditions. For
AY trials, participants spent more time on the top than the cue or bottom probe.
For BX trials, participants spent more time on the cue than the two probe
locations. Therefore, for A-cue trials, participants spent more time looking at the
top probe than the bottom probe or cue, yet on BX trials participants spent more
time looking at the cue than either the top or bottom probe. This was as expected
for the A-cue trials because the consistently top-right located probe was meant to
create a bias toward looking to that location. However, it seems somewhat
unexpected that we do not find the corresponding results for BX trials. In other
words, why did the bias generated for looking to the bottom probe location not
occur in these trials and instead the highest TVD was spent on the cue? It should
be noted that the 2nd longest TVD was on the bottom probe and not the top probe
location, indicating the participants did adhere to the observed rule to an extent.
It is possible the highest TVD was on the cue throughout the ISI during BX
trials because participants were properly integrating the identity of the B cue with
the observed rule to give a non-target response, which requires inhibition to
respond. Allocating more cognitive effort to inhibiting a target response may have
resulted in this higher TVD on the cue location because it either requires more
context updating to prepare an inhibitory response or the participants are
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returning to the cue in order to reactivate the cue from memory. In order to
provide an explanation for this difference in eye gaze patterns for AY and BX
trials, a series of regression analyses were performed in an effort to predict PBI
based on the eye gaze data.
In the 1.5 s ISI condition, there was a negative correlation between TVD
on the cue and PBI scores during AX, AY, and BX trials. Therefore, a more
reactive participant spent more time on the cue than the top or bottom probes.
This may be due to primarily reactive participants requiring more time on context
updating to prepare their response. We can infer from this that proactive
participants are actively incorporating the rule for giving a target response while
observing the cue, therefore, they look away from the cue toward the probe
during the ISI faster. These findings may prove to provide an ocular signature for
modes of cognitive control. While superior updating abilities may be responsible
for the decreased TVD spent on the cue, an alternative hypothesis would be that
the reason there is an increased amount of TVD on the cue for reactive
participants is they allocated their attention back to the cue location after looking
to the probe location in order to reactivate the goal in memory. This would mean
returning to the cue location after glancing at the probe location may be indicative
of a lower PBI because of reactivation and not due to an increased amount of
time required for context updating.
For the 3 s ISI condition, longer TVD on the cue was associated with lower
PBI for AX trials, but did not predict PBI for AY or BX trials. These findings differ
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from Reimer et al. where only a 3 s ISI condition was used. In the Reimer et al.
study, AOI location gaze patterns predicted PBI, including for AY and BX trials.
However, for the 3 s ISI condition in this study, this was only partially replicated.
This may have been due to different potential limitations of the study, which will
be discussed further.
It is possible that proactive participants look almost immediately to the top
probe location in AY trials because switching to maintaining the goal, rather than
updating, is where they expend the most cognitive effort. Reactive participants
may spend more time on the cue location during the ISI because they are
updating longer than proactive ones. If less effort is spent context updating, the
cue’s identity may not be held in working memory as well, regardless of how well
the goal itself is being maintained in memory. This may be why proactive
participants make more errors during AY trials. Usually a target response is
supposed to follow an A-cue due to the disproportionate amount of AX and AY
trials, so they are focusing on their prepared response after seeing an A-cue and
not allocating as much time to fully integrating the cue’s identity with the
observed rule to the extent that a more reactive participant would.
For BX trials, participants classified as primarily reactive also spent more
time on the cue than the probe locations during the ISI as well. Slower RT on BX
trials is typically associated with reactivity and it may be that extra time spent
updating comes with a cost of spending more time to inhibit a target response.
Their reactivity is triggered by the X probe and are forced to recall whether the
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first letter was an A or B, which takes time. On AY trials, proactive participants
are the ones who take longer to inhibit a target response. The association
between less context updating and slower PBI RT on AY trials may indicate that
proactive participants take longer to inhibit a target response on this trial type
because they did not integrate the observed rule with the cue’s identity as well.

Limitations
There are some limitations of the study that should be considered. For
example, the study was conducted during an almost 3-week time period, but it
was at the end of the academic quarter. Preparing for exams at the end of a
course generally leaves students more fatigued than usual and perhaps this
affected the participants’ ability to allocate their attention to the screen or move
their gaze as quickly as they would have otherwise. Another potential limitation to
consider is the cross-cultural applicability of these findings. The participants all
spoke English, a language read from left to right and top to bottom. It is possible
using letters of the alphabet as stimuli provides an inclination toward looking to
the top-right of the screen next for those who speak a certain language.
However, there are many written languages throughout the world where letters or
characters are read from right to left. It would be interesting to see if the direction
one typically reads would affect participants’ eye movements if we switched the
location of probes on A-cue and B-cue trials.
The sample size may be a limitation of this study as well. 87 participants
went through the experiment, but 18 were excluded from analysis. Most of those
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excluded were done so because the eye tracker captured less than 50% of the
potential eye gaze data. Therefore, the eye tracker itself was somewhat of a
limitation in the study. Additionally, almost all participants in the study were
young adults and the applicability of these findings to other age groups may be
hasty because the external validity has not yet been determined. Most
participants were also female, albeit the current research has not found interindividual differences in performance on the AX-CPT based on gender.

Conclusion
For the 3 s ISI condition, we were only able to partially replicate Reimer et
al. (2020) for the AY and BX trials. Cue TVD did not predict PBI in this condition.
However, while it did predict PBI for the 1.5 s condition, cue TVD was negatively
associated with PBI. This conflicts with the Reimer et al. (2020) study where cue
TVD was positively associated with PBI. As previously mentioned, a limitation of
the study was that it took place within the last 3 weeks of the academic quarter.
Students may not have had the attentional endurance to concentrate for the
longer, 3 s ISI. Further studies need to be conducted for replication of the results
for either the 3 s ISI condition in this study or the 3 s ISI used in Reimer et al.
This study sought to test whether the findings of Reimer et al. (2020)
persisted when a shorter ISI was used, which greatly decreased the demand on
context maintenance. We found that reactive participants spent more time on the
cue during the ISI than proactive ones in the 1.5 s condition, which taken with the
results of Reimer et al. (2020), cannot confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that
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part of the increased cue TVD in proactive participants in the previous study was
due to cue maintenance. With further replication of these studies, we may yet
ascertain the salience of context updating when employing the two modes of
cognitive control.
This study attempted to unsnarl context updating from maintenance in
cognitive control and may have done so if the 3 s ISI condition in Reimer et al.
had been completely replicated. However, the results of the 1.5 s ISI condition
implicate a different eye movement pattern to that which was discerned by
Reimer et al. in order to predict PBI. More studies should be conducted to
confirm this pattern in the 3 s ISI condition. The results of our 1.5 s ISI condition
may yet answer the question as to whether maintenance is responsible for the
longer TVD spent on the cue in proactive participants from Reimer et al. (2020).
If this eye gaze paradigm exists for both the 1.5 s and 3 s ISI conditions, then it is
unlikely that increased context maintenance in proactive participants is the
reason they spend less time on the cue during the ISI. Context updating may be
a more central component of cognitive control than maintenance, therefore,
requiring larger attentional allocation or cognitive effort. However, it should be
emphasized that the results of this study are inconclusive without further
replication of the 3 s ISI condition eye gaze pattern, regardless of whether the
replication shows a positive or negative association between cue TVD and PBI.
The analyses performed for this study showed a negative association between
cue TVD and PBI, which contrasts with the positive association found in Reimer
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et al. (2020). Therefore, further research should attempt to replicate either of
these studies’ findings. In summation, context updating plays a significant role in
cognitive control and how much context updating a person does may be a
predictor of PBI.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
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Table 1. Mean Correct Response Times and Error Rates (in Proportions) by Trial
Type and Delay
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Table 2. Delay by Location (in Total Visit Duration Proportions)
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Table 3. Trial Type by Location (in Total Visit Duration Proportions)
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Figure 1. A Pair of Letters Shown Sequentially in the AX-Continuous
Performance Test.
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Figure 2. A Modified Version of the AX-Continuous Performance Test 40 with the
Cue (A) Appearing in the Left-center of the Monitor Screen and the Probe (X)
Appearing at the Top-right.
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Figure 3. A Modified Version of the AX-Continuous Performance Test 40 with the
Cue (B) Appearing in the Left-center of the Monitor Screen and the Probe (Y)
Appearing at the Bottom-right.
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Figure 4. A Modified Version of the AX-Continuous Performance Test 40 with the
Cue (A) Appearing in the Left-center of the Monitor Screen and the Probe (Y)
Appearing at the Top-right.
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Figure 5. A Modified Version of the AX-Continuous Performance Test 40 with the
Cue (B) Appearing in the Left-center of the Monitor Screen and the Probe (X)
Appearing at the Bottom-right.
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Figure 6. Areas of Interest for Eye Tracker. The Cue is the Area of Interest on the
Left with the Two Areas of Interest on the Right Representing the Two Possible
Probe Locations.
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Figure 7. AY Trials: Cue Total Visit Duration Predicted Proactive Behavioral
Index in Participants Who Spent More Time Looking at the Cue Area of Interest
than the Top Probe Area of Interest.
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Figure 8. AY Trials: Cue Total Visit Duration Did Not Predict Proactive Behavioral
Index for Participants Who Spent More Time Looking at the Top Area of Interest
than the Cue.

65

Figure 9. BX Trials: Increased Total Visit Duration in the Cue Region was
Associated with Higher Proactive Behavioral Index.
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Figure 10. Schematic Overview of the AX-Continuous Performance Test.
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